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Tnis letter is submitted pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. At pages 25 and 2 6 of the 
Respondent's Brief, respondent requested that he be awarded his 
costs and attorney's fees on appeal, Respondentf s counsel has 
subsequently located two very recent ai ithorities which are on 
point, 
"Attorney fees on appeal may be granted in 
the discretion of the court in conformance 
with statute or rule." Management Services 
Corp. v. Development Assocs, 617 P.2d 406, 
408 (Utah 1980). Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 
(1984) provides that either party to a 
divorce action may be ordered to pay the 
adverse party to prosecute or defend the 
action. This includes attorney fees incurred 
on appeal....In view of our affirmance and 
the record evidence of... financial need, we 
exercise our discretion and award...attorney 
fees on appeal." Maughn v. Maughn 102 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 44 770 P.2d 157, 162 (Utah App. 
1989). 
«j»jle second authorl 
Appeals July 12, 1989. 
an opinion tiled by the Court of 
"Because it is obvious from the record that 
the trial court's findings were not clearly 
erroneous, we are convinced that Annette's 
appeal is frivolous. In such circumstances, 
Rule 33(a) of this court requires that we 
award attorneys fees in a reasonable amount 
to the respondent." Fife v. Fife, 112 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 45, 46 (Utah App. 1989). 
These authorities are submitted in support of respondent's 
position that he should be awarded attorneyfs fees and costs as 
an offset against a payment due and owing from respondent to 
appellant on August 1, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A 
Ben H. Hadfield 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORPE 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the Z- day of August, 1989, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing to Kelly G. Cardon, Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant at 3856 Washington Blvd., Ogden, Utah 84403, 
A 
Ben H. Hadfield 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court's decision not awarding attorney's 
fees to the plaintiff constitute an abuse of discretion? 
2. After considering all required factors for an alimony 
award, did the trial court's decision so vary from the evidence 
as to constitute a clear abuse of discretion? 
3. After considering all of the proper factors in a 
property division, did the trial court's actual division so vary 
from the evidence as to constitute a clear abuse of discretion? 
4. Are the plaintiff's contentions on appeal so frivolous 
or in contradiction to the evidence, that attorney's fees should 
be assessed on appeal against the plaintiff? 
iii 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(Respondent differs with some of the statements of 
fact set forth in the Appellant's Brief. The additional 
facts are set forth below. Paragraph numbers correspond 
to the numbers in Appellant's Statement of the Facts.) 
5. Plaintiff testified that she had experienced various 
health problems. On cross-examination, she conceded that her 
claimed ulcer, hearing loss, and hand problems were not of 
sufficient magnitude as to affect her employability in the school 
lunch program. (T. 11/24/87 a.m. p.101). 
6. Defendant's ability to earn additional income through 
overtime decreased dramatically beginning in 1988. During the 
first five months of that year, the defendant had a total of 2 0 
hours overtime. (6/7/88 T. p. 2). 
15. During the marriage the parties acquired a homestead at 
Elwood consisting of a house on .82 acres with an adjacent 
unimproved lot of .79 acres. Plaintiff's expert valued the home 
and .82 acre lot at between $28,000.00 to $31,000.00, taking into 
consideration the repairs that needed to be completed. 
(Pis. Ex. #2.). 
Appellant's reliance on the claimed appraisal by Reed Willis 
is unfounded and outside of the record. At the conclusion of the 
November 24th trial, the court ordered that the only additional 
evidence allowed would be limited to the valuation of the farm 
property and the "junk". (11/24/87 T. p.m. p. 191, 192; 6/7/88 
T. p. 7). 
16. The only evidence offered by the plaintiff concerning 
the value of the Bear River mobile home and property indicated a 
value of between $20,000.00 and $37,000.00. (11/24/87 T. a.m. 
p. 45). Defendant's expert valued the same property at 
$26,000.00. (11/24/87 T. p.m. p. 7, 15.) The evidence cited by 
plaintiff on appeal as to the appraised value of the Bear River 
property by Reed Willis was inadmissible and is not a part of the 
evidence in this case. (11/24/87 p.m. T, pp. 191, 192; 6/7/88 T. 
p. 7). 
17. The trial judge personally viewed and inspected the 
farm property consisting of two parcels of 154 acres and 148.6 
acres respectively. The judge further viewed the Carl Hansen and 
Curtis Christensen parcels and also the properties cited by 
appraiser Reed Willis as comparables 1 and 2 in his appraisal. 
(6/7/88 T. pp.48-49). 
18. Evidence of values appraised by Reed Willis for 
household furniture and appliances was inadmissible and not 
accepted nor reviewed by the court. (11/24/87 p.m. T. 
pp. 191, 192; 6/7/88 T. p. 7). 
20. The defendant was ordered to assume marital debts 
totalling $58,594.49. The monthly debt service obligation on 
these amounts was $1,082.48. Additionally, a commercial note 
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with a balance of $10,844.52 was due in its entirety in January, 
1988. (R. 216 Def. Exhibits Nos. 17 and 18). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. A portion of the plaintiff's attorney's fees was paid 
from joint funds leaving a balance of approximately $1600. Using 
the court's valuations in its property division, the plaintiff 
was awarded a total of $79,888.00 and defendant was awarded 
$77,406.00. This creates a difference in favor of the plaintiff 
in the amount of $2,482.00. Part of the plaintiff's property is 
in the form of two substantial cash payments to be made to her 
from the defendant. The court's decision to classify this as 
property division which favors the plaintiff rather than as an 
award of attorney's fees, does not constitute an abuse of 
discretion. 
2. The Findings, Memorandum Decision, and evidentiary 
records show that the court seriously weighed and considered the 
required three factors in formulating its alimony award. The 
order formulated by the court was carefully crafted to ensure the 
economic survival of both parties. The amount of alimony awarded 
to the plaintiff was adequate and fair under all of the 
circumstances presented by the evidence. 
3. The trial court divided the property in such a way as 
to award the plaintiff nearly $80,000.00 in debt free assets, 
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which were the assets of the marriage most easily convertible to 
cash. It was reasonable to allow the defendant a two-year period 
in which to pay offsetting value to the plaintiff, because the 
farm property is in imminent danger of foreclosure and there are 
no funds immediately available. 
4. The defendant should be awarded his costs and 
attorney's fees on appeal. The appellants contentions are not 
supported by the record and in fact contradict her own testimony 
and that of her expert witnesses. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DESCRETION IN 
NOT AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES TO EITHER SIDE. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated: 
"The decision to make such an award 
(attorney's fees), together with the amount 
thereof, rests primarily with the sound 
discretion of the trial court." Kerr v. 
Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah 1980). See 
also Adams v. Adams, 593 P.2d 147 (Utah 
1979); Bader v. Bader, 18 Utah 2d 407, 424 
P.2d 150 (1967) . 
On this point as well as in the other issues raised on 
appeal, plaintiff seems to be taking the position that merely 
because the trial court did not do as she requested, it abused 
its discretion. 
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The trial court found as of January 11, 1988, that the 
plaintiff had incurred attorney's fees of approximately $1700.00, 
a portion of which was paid from joint funds accrued during the 
marriage, and that the defendant had incurred attorney's fees in 
excess of $2,000.00. (R 139, 142, 147, 226 and 233). It appears 
the only issue which is raised is whether the plaintiff's need 
for an award of attorney's fees was so great that the court's 
decision constituted an abuse of discretion. 
In considering the issue of need, it is appropriate to 
consider not only the income of the plaintiff but also the nature 
and value of assets awarded to her. Based upon the court's 
findings of value, the plaintiff was awarded $70,800.00 in 
property plus cash payments from the defendant totalling 
$9,000.00. The property awarded to plaintiff is virtually debt 
free, whereas defendant was ordered to assume over $58,000.00 in 
debts. The time delay making $4,500.00 due in 1989 and an 
additional $4,500.00 payable in 1990 was reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
The court awarded plaintiff real and personal property and a 
substantial cash payment in a manner that produced a $2,482.00 
surplus or excess to the plaintiff. This amount is substantially 
more than the attorney's fees which plaintiff sought to be 
awarded. The fact that the court did not call this differential 
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an award of attorney's fees does not diminish the fact that the 
court fashioned an equitable solution. 
II. 
THE TRIAL COURT, AFTER CONSIDERING ALL REQUIRED FACTORS, 
MADE A PROPER AND EQUITABLE ALIMONY AWARD. 
Numerous Utah appellate cases hold that the trial judge must 
be allowed wide latitude of discretion in matters relating to 
alimony, and the courtfs judgment should not be disturbed unless 
the facts show it works a manifest inequity. Whitehead v. 
Whitehead, 16 Utah 2d 179, 397 P.2d 987, See also Gill v. Gill, 
718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986); Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 
1982). 
A. The Trial Court Considered the Proper Factors in Fixing 
the Alimony Award. 
This court in Lee v. Lee, 744 P.2d 1378 (Utah App. 1987) 
held that the same three factors must be considered in fixing 
alimony as appellant has cited in her brief. Appellant's brief 
tacitly acknowledges that the trial court considered these 
factors, but appellant argues the court's decision manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. When considered in light of the 
evidence presented to the court, these factors show that the 
court's decision was both reasonable and fair. 
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1. Plaintiffs Financial Condition and Needs. 
Plaintiff's testimony at trial was that her monthly 
living expenses for herself and her two minor children were 
$1,090.00. This excludes the $259.00 house payment, which 
appellant acknowledges has now been eliminated. The court 
awarded the plaintiff $197.00 per month child support for the 
minor child, Sharla Munns, which support will continue through 
May, 1990. The court additionally awarded the plaintiff $197.00 
per month child support in behalf of the minor child, Sheldon 
Munns, which support shall continue through September, 1993 (R 
138, 139, and 230). The court additionally ordered the defendant 
to pay to plaintiff the sum of $3 00.00 per month alimony. 
(R 231). 
There was considerable testimony at trial that the 
double-wide mobile home located in Bear River City had rented out 
at $250.00 to $300.00 per month and could be so rented in the 
future. (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 115.) 
The plaintiff presumably has or will receive $5500.00 from 
the sale of the unrecorded interest in the building lot in 
Elwood. Additionally, the plaintiff is awarded a building lot 
next to the home which could be sold for $6,000.00 to $10,000.00. 
Finally, the plaintiff will receive during the next two years the 
sum of $9,000.00 in cash payments as a property settlement. 
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These three assets, which easily could be converted to cash, have 
a value of at least $20,000.00. Assuming the stability of 
present interest rates, the plaintiff could place this $20,000.00 
in a federally insured savings institution and earn an interest 
income of approximately $150.00 per month. 
The mathematical result of these figures is as follows: 
$ 394.00 child support 
$ 300.00 alimony 
$ 250.00 rental income 
$ 150.00 interest income 
$1,094.00 Total Income 
Thus Judge Low was more than justified in fixing the alimony 
award at the sum of $300.00. An analysis of the plaintiff's 
needs shows that this amount will provide her with all of the 
income which she testified she needed, even if she were not to 
receive any income from her own employment. 
2. The Ability of the Party Seeking Alimony to Produce 
a Sufficient Income for Herself. 
The plaintiff's ability to produce sufficient income 
for herself includes the ability of assets owned by her to 
generate income. Thus the court was entitled to conclude that 
the assets awarded to the plaintiff could reasonably generate 
approximately $400.00 per month income without dissipating any of 
the principal. When this figure is added to the amount of child 
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support as fixed by the child support schedule, it shows that the 
remaining amount needed by plaintiff to reach her stated income 
needs of $1,090.00 per month is $296.00. The $300.00 per month 
alimony award is therefore directly on target. 
The evidence at trial was undisputed that the plaintiff 
is capable of part-time employment. Appellant's brief made 
numerous references to health problems of the plaintiff. The 
claims in appellant's brief overstated the extent of the problems 
and did not conform to the evidence. The following excerpt from 
the transcript is useful on this point. Defendant's counsel is 
cross-examining the plaintiff. 
"Q: Counsel asked you if you could go 
to work for the school lunch program. In 
reference to the school lunch program, does 
your hearing affect your job? 
A: No. 
Q: Does your ulcer affect your job? 
A: I don't think it would. 
Q: Do your hands? 
A: Well this one that I just got operated on, it 
was pretty sore, but they're getting better." 
(T. 11/24/87 p.101, lines 14-22). 
Concerning her part-time employment with the school lunch 
program, the plaintiff admitted under cross-examination that if 
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she were hired as a regular employee, it may generate as much as 
$250.00 or $300.00 per month. (T. 11/24/87 a.m., pp. 86 and 87). 
The trial court would clearly have been justified in 
finding that the plaintiff has the ability to produce 
approximately $300.00 per month income, and that therefore her 
alimony need was actually lower than the $300.00 per month 
awarded. 
3. The Ability of the Other Spouse to Pay Support. 
The defendant's Exhibit No. 18 as well as his testimony 
at trial (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 114-118) demonstrate that the 
defendant's base take-home pay is $1935.00 per month. At the 
time of trial, the debts which were ordered assumed by the 
defendant plus the child support and alimony obligations left the 
defendant with the sum of $258.52 for his monthly living 
expenses. This sum of $258.52 was to cover his housing, food, 
clothing, fuel, insurance and personal expenses. The Bronco 
payment has now been completed, but the defendant's alimony 
obligation was increased to $300.00, the net effect of these 
developments is that the defendant now has a total of $410.83 
from his base take-home on which he must live. The defendant 
works overtime whenever possible to create additional income in 
order to survive. However, the most recent evidence showed that 
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his income from overtime had been practically eliminated. (T. 
6/7/88 p. 7). 
Throughout the proceedings the plaintiff contended she 
was seeking $850.00 per month alimony. No basis or justification 
for this figure was ever provided. When added with the child 
support obligation it substantially exceeds the monthly financial 
needs to which she testified. Yet plaintiff, on appeal, claims 
the defendant has the ability to pay her $850.00 per month 
alimony. Such an assertion is outrageous and indefensible. In 
light of the evidence presented to the court it is clear that the 
District Judge properly considered each of the three factors 
relevant to the computation of an alimony award, and crafted an 
award which was both fair and reasonable. If anyone suffers 
economic hardship as a result of the court's alimony award, it is 
certainly the defendant and not the plaintiff. 
B. Terminating the Alimony When Social Security and 
Retirement Pension Income Become Available Was Reasonable. 
Addendum H of the appellant's brief clearly demonstrates 
that upon attaining her 62nd birthday, the plaintiff will be 
entitled to receive social security benefits in an amount of at 
least $204.00 per month. That is a projected amount using 
today's figures. The actual amount could increase due to the 
defendant's earnings and contributions to the social security 
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system during the next three years, or due to simple cost of 
living adjustments in the benefits. 
The plaintiff was additionally awarded a one-half interest 
in all retirement benefits accrued during the marriage in the 
Morton-Thiokol Pension Plan. Neither of plaintiff's attorneys 
has yet submitted a Qualified Domestic Relations Order to the 
court, although paragraph 7 of the Decree specifies that the 
court will enter such an order once it is prepared by plaintiff's 
counsel (R. 231). Once such an order has been entered, the 
plaintiff would be free to select from among several methods of 
distribution authorized under the retirement plan. She would not 
be restricted, even though the defendant may choose a different 
method of distribution or may continue employment after she 
commences receiving benefits. IRC § 414(p)(3). (Full text 
Addendum A). Attached to this brief as Addendum B is a copy of a 
letter from the Morton-Thiokol, Inc. Pension Plan computing the 
defendant's retirement benefits as of September 8, 1988, the date 
of the final Divorce Decree. The computation shows that the 
plaintiff would receive the sum of $626.93 per month at age 65. 
The plaintiff's one-half of this amount would be $313.00 per 
month. Assuming a discount due to the plaintiff beginning to 
draw her benefits at age 62, the plan can still be reasonably 
expected to yield her at least $250.00 per month. 
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The criteria to be considered by the court in fixing an 
alimony award are at that point in time sufficiently changed to 
justify the termination of further alimony. When the plaintiff 
reaches age 62 in calendar year 1991, her needs will decrease as 
one of the minor children obtains majority. The $1,090.00 per 
month need to which she testified at trial, might conceivably 
reduce to approximately $970.00 per month for her and the 
remaining one minor child. 
Secondly, in 1991, the plaintifffs ability to produce a 
sufficient income for herself increases. A scenario of the 
plaintifffs 1991 monthly income is as follows: 
$ 197.00 child support 
$ 0 alimony 
$ 250.00 rental income 
$ 150.00 interest income 
$ 204.00 Social Security (estimate) 
$ 250.00 Morton-Thiokol Pension (estimate) 
$1,051.00 Total Income 
plus (?) Any income earned by plaintiff from 
part-time employment 
The plaintiff incorrectly argues that alimony should 
supplement her income during her retirement. The Utah Supreme 
Court has previously addressed this issue as to whether alimony 
should continue during retirement and has stated: 
"Here, the thrust of defendant's 
testimony is that she needs this 
alimony in order to augment her 
retirement income... 
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one of the functions of alimony is 
not to provide retirement income. 
We do not want to confuse alimony 
with annuity." Dehm v. Dehm, 545 
P.2d 525, 528, 529 (Utah 1976) 
In this present case the plaintiff will clearly receive two 
separate annuities in the form of social security and the Morton-
Thiokol, Inc. Pension Plan. All of the evidence indicates that 
at age 62 the plaintiff will be able to provide for her financial 
needs. 
Ill 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE A PAIR AND EQUITABLE 
PROPERTY DIVISION 
The appellant's brief contains the following summary and 
observations concerning review of property divisions. 
"The Utah Supreme Court has also stated that the duty 
of the trial court is to 'make a distribution of 
property and income so that the parties may readjust 
their lives to their new circumstances as well as 
possible.' Gardner vs. Gardner 748 p. 2d 1076, 1078. 
Obviously, in order to meet this goal, the trial court 
must have considerable flexibility in its 
distributions• 
The trial court in this case has carefully crafted a 
property distribution plan which appears to benefit the 
parties equally." (Appellant's brief, pp. 35-36). 
(Emphasis Added) 
Appellant concedes that the factors which should be 
considered by a trial court when it allocates property and debts 
were, in fact, considered by the District court in this case. 
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Appellant asserts, however, that the District court should have 
ordered all of the property and assets sold and the proceeds 
divided evenly between the parties. This specious proposal 
overlooks the very root of the litigation. These two parties 
simply do not agree on things. It would be impossible to get 
both sides to agree on a price at which any particular item would 
be sold. The trial court would become the referee for literally 
hundreds of disputes over individual sales. 
Appellant argues that the court had insufficient evidence 
concerning the value of the various assets. Trial courts must 
decide matters on the evidence which is presented to them. If 
there was any inadequacy in the evidence of values, the fault 
lies with the plaintiff and her counsel. Plaintiff and her 
attorney had several months advance notice that the divorce trial 
would be held on November 24, 1987. On that date she and her 
attorney came to court with numerous documents, including two 
written "appraisals". It was obvious that no effort had been 
made to have the individuals who prepared those appraisals 
present in court to testify. Plaintiff and her attorney spent 
much of the day trying to introduce into evidence documents which 
were plainly hearsay. Near the end of the trial on November 24, 
the following exchange occurred. 
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"Mr. Vlahos: My only concern is values, 
and I will be honest with you, your Honor. 
Mr. Munns won't even give us—not even on a 
gun—he won't even give me a value. 
The Court: No, but he's given more 
values than your client has today. I think 
it cuts both ways." (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 
184, lines 5-11). 
At the conclusion of the November 24 trial, plaintiff's 
attorney asked the court for a further hearing at which to 
present evidence. The following exchange occurred. 
"The Court: ...if Mr. Vlahos had rested 
his case—I don't believe he ever had. 
Mr. Vlahos: No. 
The Court: —then I would deny the 
motion. It may seem like a technical matter, 
but I think it has to turn on technical 
matters..." (T. 11/24/87 p.m. pp. 186-187). 
A review of the record reveals that, in fact, Mr. Vlahos had 
rested his case. (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 93, lines 1-2). It is 
obvious that the trial court bent over backwards to allow the 
plaintiff and her attorney to present evidence on the issue of 
values so long as such information met the requirements of the 
rules of evidence. 
The evidence concerning the various assets is summarized as 
follows: 
1. The family home located on a lot of .82 acres with an 
adjoining lot of .79 acres was valued by the court at $30,000. 
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The only evidence presented by the plaintiff was Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 2, which was a letter from a realtor fixing the value at 
$28,000 to $31,000 for the home and .82 acres. The defendant's 
expert witness, Troy Miller, fixed the value for the home and .82 
acres at $32,000. At the conclusion of the November 24, 1987 
trial, counsel for the plaintiff agreed that there had been 
sufficient evidence concerning the home and that there was no 
dispute concerning its value. 
"Mr. Hadfield: "...appraisals should be 
limited to the junk and to the farm. We did 
have a real estate broker appraisal on the 
house and the Bear River City home and I 
don't know that we have a dispute on that, do 
we? 
Mr. Vlahos: No. 
The Court: I agree." (T. 11/24/87 p.m. 
pp. 191-192) 
When the parties were next in court, over six months later, 
the plaintiff attempted to have her expert, Reed Willis, provide 
evidence concerning the value of the home. 
"Mr. Hadfield: ...I want to interpose 
an objection and I'll just do it once so that 
we can save time. I think I already read Mr. 
Vlahos and the court from the transcript of 
the conclusion of the trial where I said 
we're limiting this to the farm. We don't 
have a dispute on the home, the Bear River 
property. Mr. Vlahos said 'No, I don't have 
any dispute on those.' The court said 
'That's right, we don't.' If we could limit 
this to the farm property, that's what we— 
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The Court: I think that's right, Mr. 
Vlahos." 
Appellant's brief relies almost entirely on the value placed 
on the home by Reed Willis. This value and any evidence 
concerning it, were never a part of the evidence in this action. 
Appellant's arguments in that regard are totally misdirected. 
2. The defendant valued the farm at $75,650 based on two 
sales which were very close to the time of the trial and located 
adjacent to the subject property. The defendant further 
testified that approximately 60 acres of the farm was 
nonproductive and non-usable. (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 96). 
At the further hearing on June 7, 1988, the plaintiff 
produced Reed Willis as an expert real estate appraiser. Under 
cross-examination, Mr. Willis' opinion as to the value of the 
farm property went from $190,000 down to $122,500 and then down 
to $112,000 in a period of less than ten minutes. (T. 06/07/88, 
pp. 15, 16, & 20). This type of performance by an expert witness 
is not likely to inspire confidence that his opinion is accurate. 
Mr. Willis based his appraisal on what he claimed were three 
comparable sales of property. His comparable No. 3 was a parcel 
of land near the Chesapeake Duck Club which was sold for use as a 
duck hunting club. 
"The Court: ...you have reminded me of 
something I wanted to ask Mr. Willis. That 
is, regarding this duck club. If 
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agricultural land is sold to a duck club for 
duck hunting purposes, and the highest and 
best use of that land is duck hunting and 
agricultural as opposed to land for which is 
not duck hunting, but simply agricultural, 
wouldn't that increase the value of the duck 
hunting club or duck hunting land? 
The Witness: Yeah. But whatfs happened 
is out in those areas, they buy whatever 
parcels come up. And they're not all 
contiguous. 
The Court: Still, they buy land out 
there that is usable for duck hunting, where 
this land, I suppose, the ducks aren't quite 
as plentiful. 
The Witness: Right." (T. 6/7/88, p. 
35, lines 6-19). 
"The Court: If I were hunting ducks, I 
would hunt near the sloughs and Chesapeake 
Duck Club as opposed to the Munns property. 
The Witness: Right." (T. 6/7/88, p. 37, 
lines 8-11). 
It is obvious from the foregoing exchanges that the trial 
court felt that this was a rather unreliable and bizarre 
"comparable". 
At the June 7, 1988 hearing, rather than present any further 
evidence, the defendant simply requested the court to physically 
view the Munns farm property and those parcels identified by Mr. 
Willis as comparables No. 1 and 2. Plaintiff's counsel did not 
object to this arrangement. Both parties and their attorneys, 
along with the trial judge, then traveled to the location of the 
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farm property. Because the Curtis Christensen and Carl Hansen 
parcels adjoin the Munns1 property, they were also viewed by the 
court. The court obviously used the observations which it made 
at this time in determining the value of the Munns1 farm property 
as it related to the Christensen and Hansen properties and to 
comparables No. 1 and 2 of Mr. Reed Willis1 appraisal. 
3. The junk vehicles and scrap metal, including inoperable 
farm equipment, etc. was valued by the court at $10,000. The 
defendant testified that a representative from Atlas Steel had 
viewed the material and had made a bid of $10,000 for the lot. 
Plaintiff's expert, Reed Willis, valued the cars, trucks, and 
farm implements as scrap metal at $7,500. He did not place a 
value on the Thiokol scrap metal other than to assert that since 
it was originally purchased for approximately $21,000, it must 
now have a value of at least $21,000. Under cross-examination 
Mr. Willis was asked if a family which purchased $5,000 worth of 
groceries in a year would at the conclusion of the year have 
$5,000 worth of groceries in the pantry. Mr. Willis conceded 
that this method of valuation was somewhat ludicrous. (T. 
6/7/88, p. 22). Mr. Willis further conceded that he had no idea 
how much of the metal had been sold since the $21,000 purchase. 
(T. 6/7/88 p. 23). 
Appellant's brief at page 43 states: 
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"Plaintiff's records show that defendant spent in 
excess of $20,000 purchasing scrap metal from Thiokol, 
and plaintiff believes that none of this scrap metal 
has been sold." (Emphasis added) 
This assertion is in flat contradiction to the evidence 
presented at trial by the plaintiff. 
"Q: Do you know whether that scrap has 
even been sold? 
A: He probably sold some of it to 
different people that would come and want 
some scrap. 
Q: There isn't that much metal out 
there now as far as you know? 
A: He's just sold the better part of 
it. 
Q: The better part of it is sold? 
A: Right " (T. 11/24/87 a.m. p. 66, 
lines 12-20). 
The defendant, himself, testified at trial concerning the 
Thiokol scrap metal as follows: 
Q: The scrap metal that was shown on 
one of the plaintiff's exhibits from Morton 
Thiokol was something like 920,000 pounds. 
Has most of that been sold over the years? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Do you have any idea what portion 
would still remain? 
A: Well, the bad portion, I suspect. 
A lot of the good stuff people has already 
had their pick and took it. 
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Q: But that's included in this $10,000 
figure. 
A: Yes, sir." (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 110 
lines 5-17). 
4. Concerning the household furnishings, the defendant 
testified that their present value was approximately $5,000, 
including virtually everything in the family home in the way of 
personal property. (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 105). The plaintiff 
claimed that the personal property had a value of approximately 
$780 based upon a short list containing only six items. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit #4, p. 15). The plaintiff admitted under 
cross-examination that she had omitted significant items of 
personal property from her list of the property in the home. (T. 
11/24/87 a.m. pp. 88-89). Based upon the evidence presented to 
the court at trial, the court was certainly justified in fixing 
the value of the household furnishings and assets at $3,000. 
5. Appellant's brief claims that a review of the exact 
items distributed reveals that the plaintiff has received 
properties which are not easily converted to cash. Again, 
appellant's assertions are in direct contradiction to the 
testimony presented by her own expert, Reed Willis. 
Q: Over on page 11 again, you made an 
observation that I just want to direct the 
court's attention to. You feel that in order 
for marketability of the three properties, 
the mobile home in Bear River City would sell 
easiest, the single home in Elwood would sell 
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next, and the farmland would be hardest to 
sell. Is that correct? 
The Witness: That—that would probably 
be right." (T. 6/7/88, p. 23). 
Appellant additionally claims in her brief that used farm 
machinery sells better than new farm machinery and the defendant 
may be able to sell some of the used farm machinery and easily 
generate cash. (Appellant's brief, p. 45). The plaintiff called 
Brent Baugh as an expert witness concerning the value of used 
farm equipment. The following excerpt is from his testimony 
under cross-examination. 
Q: Things have been real tough the past 
few years as far as selling agricultural 
equipment? 
A: Yes. 
Q: In fact, if Mr. or Mrs. Munns would 
be to place items for sale at the value 
listed, they may sit there for a year looking 
for a buyer, wouldnft they? 
A: They very well could." (T. 11/24/87 
p.m. p. 27). 
In both of the above instances the excerpts quoted are 
evidence presented by plaintifffs own witnesses. One other item 
worthy of note is that over ten percent of the plaintifffs 
property award is in the form of actual cash. The plaintifffs 
argument that the particular items awarded to her work a hardship 
for her simply is not supported by any of the evidence. 
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6. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing the defendant two years in which to make the payments 
for adjusting the property values, A review of the entire 
transcript and all of the exhibits makes clear that there was 
absolutely no cash available for either of the parties. The 
loans which were ordered assumed by the defendant were delinquent 
and the farm is in danger of foreclosure, (T. 11/24/87 p.m. p. 
34). (See Addendum C, letter of December 21, 1988 from 
respondent's counsel to appellant's counsel). The defendant is 
living on approximately $410 per month plus whatever he can make 
on the side, (T. 11/24/87 p.m. pp. 114-118, Defendant's Exhibit 
#18). Under these circumstances the party suffering a hardship 
as a result of the court's order is the defendant, not the 
plaintiff. Producing the two required payments of $4,500 each 
will, at best, be very difficult. To argue that the cash should 
have been made payable immediately is to ignore the entire 
evidentiary record. 
IV 
THE DEFENDANT RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL. 
The appellant concedes that the trial court weighed all of 
the required considerations on the issues of (1) attorney fees, 
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(2) alimony, and (3) property division. Appellant argues that 
despite these proper considerations, the trial court abused its 
discretion in the awards which it made. 
Appellant fails to tie her claims of abuse of discretion to 
the actual evidentiary record. There are numerous claims and 
assertions in appellant's brief which are in direct contradiction 
to the evidence provided by the plaintiff and her experts at 
trial. Appellant quotes liberally from those portions of the 
Reed Willis cippraisal which were not even allowed into evidence. 
(Specifically, his valuations concerning the home, Bear River 
property, and the home furnishings). The only trace of those 
aspects of his appraisal to be found anywhere in the transcripts 
are the excerpts quoted by respondent in this brief wherein the 
trial court cicknowledged that it would not receive evidence on 
those issues. 
Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals provides 
that: 
"If the court determines ... an appeal taken 
under these rules is...frivolous...it shall 
aweird just damages and single or double 
costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, 
to the prevailing party." 
Further, a frivolous appeal has been defined as: 
"one having no reasonable, legal or factual 
basis as defined in Rule 40(a)". O'Brien v. 
Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987); 
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Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230, 
1236 (Utah App. 1988). 
Defendant-Respondent has no desire to harm plaintiff, but 
this appeal threatens the defendant with financial ruin. A 
foreclosure of the farm property would take approximately 8 0% of 
all of the property which the defendant was awarded from the 
marriage. The defendant is living on $410.00 per month. The 
defendant must produce two payments to the plaintiff in the 
amount of $4500.00 each during the next 18 months. Due to the 
total lack of any basis in the trial record for the allegations 
made by appellant, respondent requests that he be awarded his 
costs and attorney's fees on this appeal, said amount to be 
offset against the first $4500.00 payment due to the plaintiff 
pursuant to the Decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court heard and viewed all of the evidence, and 
the court's findings and decision are amply supported by the 
record. The appellant's "version" of facts does not find support 
from the record or the trial court's findings. 
Therefore, this court should affirm the district court's 
decision, dismiss the above-captioned appeal, and award 
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respondent's costs, and remand to the district court for a 
determination of attorney's fees awarded on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of May, 1989. 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
By 
Ben H. Hadfield 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) copies of this 
Respondent's Brief to the following: 
Kelly G. Cardon, Judy Dawn Barking 
Attorneys for Appellant 
3856 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
this day of May, 1989. 
Ben H. Hadfield 
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requirements listed in paragraph (3) are met for periods after the close of the 1-year period referred 
to in paragraph (2); except that years of service for the recipient shall be determined by taking into 
account the entire period for which the leased employee performed services for the recipient (or 
related persons). 
(5) SAFE HARBOR.—This subsection shall not apply to any leased employee if such employee is 
covered by a plan which is maintained by the leasing organization if, with respect to such employee, 
such plan— 
(A) is a money purchase pension plan with a nonintegrated employer contribution rate of at 
least 71/2 percent, and 
(B) provides for immediate participation and for full and immediate vesting. 
(6) RELATED PERSONS.—For purposes of this subsection, the term "related persons" has the 
same meaning as when used in section 103(b)(6)(C). 
Source: New. 
Amendments: Sec. as amended preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting in lieu thereof 
effective: "any person who is not an employee of the recipient and". 
PL. 98-369, § § :?26( b)( 1), j ^ e
 ab0ve amendment applies to tax years beginning 
713d) 
P.L. 97-248, § 248(a) 
after December 31, 1983. 
P.L. 97-248, § 248(a): 
P.L. 98-369, § § 526(bXl), 713(i): Added new subsection < n) as shown above. 
Act Sees. 526(b)(1) and 713(i) amended Code Sec. The above amendment is effective for tax years beginning 
414(n><2) by striking out "any person" in the material after December 31, 1983. 
[Sec. 414(o)] 
Co; REGULATIONS.—The Secretary shall prescribe such regulations (which may provide rules in 
addition to the rules contained in subsections (m) and (n)) as may be necessary to prevent the avoidance 
of any employee benefit requirement listed in subsection im)(4) or (n)(3) through the use of— 
(1) separate organizations, 
(2) empoioyee leasing, or 
(3) other arrangements. 
Source: New. 
Amendments: Sec. as amended P.L. 98-369, § 526(d)(1): 
effective: 
PL 98-369 S^cVdVl^ Act Sec. 526(dXl) added Code Sec. 414<o), above. 
The above amendments are effective on July 18, 1984. 
[Sec. 414(p)] 
(p) QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER DEFINED.—For purposes of this subsection and 
section 401 (a)(13)— 
(1) I N G E N E R A L . — 
(A) QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER.—The term "qualified domestic relations 
order" means a domestic relations order— 
(i) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right to, or assigns 
to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable with 
respect to a participant under a plan, and 
(ii) with respect to which the requirements of paragraphs (2) and (3) are met. 
(B) DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER.—The term "domestic relations order" means any 
judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement agreement) which— 
(i) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property 
rights to a spouse [, former spouse], child, or other dependent of a participant, and 
(ii) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community 
property law). 
(2) ORDER MUST CLEARLY SPECIFY CERTAIN FACTS.—A domestic relations order meets the 
requirements of this paragraph only if such order clearly specifies— 
(A) the name and the last known mailing address (if any) of the participant and the name 
and mailing address of each alternate payee covered by the order, 
Internal Revenue Code SeC. 414(p) 
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(B) the amount or percentage of the participant's benefits to be paid by the plan to each 
such alternate payee, or the manner in which such amount or percentage is to be determined, 
(C) the number of payments or period to which such order applies, and 
(D) each plan to which such order applies. 
(3) ORDER MAY NOT ALTER AMOUNT, FORM, ETC., OF BENEFITS.—A domestic relations 
order meets the requirements of this paragraph only if such order— 
(A) does not require a plan to provide any type or form of benefit, or any option, not 
otherwise provided under the plan, 
(B) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits, (determined on the basis of 
actuarial value), and 
(C) does not require the payment of benefits to an alternate payee which are required to be 
paid to another alternate payee under another order previously determined to be a qualified 
domestic relations order. 
(4) E X C E P T I O N FOR C E R T A I N PAYMENTS M A D E AFTER EARLIEST R E T I R E M E N T A G E . — 
(A) IN GENERAL.—In the case of any payment before a participant has separated from 
service, a domestic relations order shall not be treated as failing to meet the requirements of 
subparagraph (A) of paragraph (3) solely because such order requires that payment of benefits 
be made to an alternate payee— 
(i) on or after the date on which the participant attains <or would have attained) the 
earliest retirement age, 
(ii) as if the participant had retired on the date on which such payment is to begin 
under such order (but taking into account only the present value of the benefits actually 
accrued and not taking into account the present value of any employer subsidy for early 
retirement), and 
(iii) in any form in which such benefits may be paid under the plan to the participant 
(other than in the form of a joint and survivor annuity with respect to the alternate payee 
and his or her subsequent spouse). 
For purposes of clause (ii), the interest rate assumption used in determining the present value 
shall be the interest rate specified in the plan or, if no rate is specified. 5 percent. 
(B) EARLIEST RETIREMENT AGE.—For purposes of this paragraph, the term "earliest 
retirement age" has the meaning given such term by section 417(f)(3), except that in the case of 
any defined contribution plan, the earliest retirement age snail be the date which is 10 years 
before the normal retirement age (within the meaning of section 411(a)(8)). 
(5) T R E A T M E N T OF F O R M E R SPOUSE AS SURVIVING SPOUSE FOR PURPOSES OF 
DETERMINING SURVIVOR BENEFITS.—To the extent provided in any qualified domestic relations 
order— '__. 
(A) the former spouse of a participant shall be treated as a surviving spouse of such 
participant for purposes of sections 401(a)( 11) and 417, and 
(B) if married for at least 1 year, the surviving spouse shall be treated as meeting the 
requirements of section 417(d). 
A plan shall not be treated as failing to meet the requirements of subsection (a) or (k) of section 401 
which prohibit payment of benefits before termination of employment solely by reason of payments 
to an alternate payee pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order. 
(6) PLAN PROCEDURES WITH RESPECT TO ORDERS.— 
(A) NOTICE AND DETERMINATION BY ADMINISTRATOR.—In the case of any domestic 
relations order received by a plan— 
(i) the plan administrator shall promptly notify the participant and any other 
alternate payee of the receipt of such order and the plans procedures for determining the 
qualified status of domestic relations orders, and 
(ii) within a reasonable period after receipt of such order, the plan administrator shall 
determine whether such order is a qualified domestic relations order and notify the 
participant and each alternate payee of such determination. 
Sec. 414(p) ©1986, Commerce Clearing House, Inc. 
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(B) PLAN TO ESTABLISH REASONABLE PROCEDURES.—Each plan shall establish 
reasonable procedures to determine the qualified status of domestic relations orders and to 
administer distributions under such qualified orders. 
(7) PROCEDURES FOR P E R I O D D U R I N G W H I C H DETERMINATION IS BEING M A D E . — 
(A) I N GENERAL.—During any period in which the issue of whether a domestic relations 
order is a qualified domestic relations order is being determined (by the plan administrator, by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, or otherwise), the plan administrator shall segregate in a 
separate account in the plan or in an escrow account the amounts which would have been 
payable to the alternate payee during such period if the order had been determined to be a 
qualified domestic relations order. 
(B) P A Y M E N T TO A L T E R N A T E PAYEE IF ORDER D E T E R M I N E D TO BE QUALIFIED 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS ORDER.—If within 18 months the order (or modification thereof) is 
determined to be a qualified domestic relations order, the plan administrator shall pay the 
segregated amounts (plus any interest thereon) to the person or persons entitled thereto. 
(C) PAYMENT TO PLAN PARTICIPANT IN CERTAIN CASES.—If within 18 months— 
(i) it is determined that the order is not a qualified domestic relations order, or 
(ii) the issue as to whether such order is a qualified domestic relations order is not 
resolved, 
then the plan administrator shall pay the segregated amounts (plus any interest thereon) to the 
person or persons who would have been entitled to such amounts if there had been no order. 
(D) SUBSEQUENT D E T E R M I N A T I O N OR ORDER TO BE APPLIED PROSPECTIVELY 
ONLY.—Any determination that an order is a qualified domestic relations order which is made 
after the close of the 18-month period shall be applied prospectively only. 
(8) ALTERNATE PAYEE DEFINED.—The term "alternate payee" means any spouse, former 
spouse, child or other dependent of a participant who is recognized by a domestic relations order as 
having a right to receive all, or a portion of, the benefits payable under a plan with respect to such 
participant. 
(9) CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARY.—In prescribing regulations under this 
subsection and section 401(a)( 13), the Secretary of Labor shall consult with the Secretary. 
Source: New. 
Amendments: Sec. as amended (1) shall treat such order as a qualified domestic relations 
effective: order if such administrator is paying benefits pursuant to 
P.L. 98-397, § 204(b) such order on such date, and 
P.L. 98-397, § 204(b): (2) may treat any other such order entered before such 
Added Code Sec. 414(D), above. date a s a qualified domestic relations order even if such order 
The above amendment is effective on January 1, 1985, d o e s n o t m e e t t h e requirements of such amendments, 
except that in the case of a domestic relations order entered Special rules appear in the notes for H.R. 4280 following 
before such date, the plan administrator— Code Sec. 401(a). 
[Sec. 415] 
SEC. 415. L IMITATIONS ON B E N E F I T S AND CONTRIBUTION UNDER Q U A L I F I E D 
PLANS. 
[Sec. 415(a)] 
(a) G E N E R A L RULE.—-[*] 
[*] § 2004(d), P.L. 93-406, provides as follows: October 2, 1973, or (ii) the date on which he separated from 
"(d) Effective Date. t h e s e r v i c e 0I l n e employer, 
"(1) General rule.—The amendments made bv this section
 4 „ m . „ . . *. • ^.^ ,. „„ . . I „ , , c TS L %i m«7- TL (B) such annual benetit is no greater than the annual 
shall applv to vears beginning atter December 31, 19/5. The , ,. , . ,
 n , , • n , _ °n,, tn „, , nn. • • „, 
c - C -r i. ii -i_ u i benefit which would have been pavaole to such participant Secretarv ot the Treasury shal prescribe such regulations as • . -
 r . ,, ., . „ - , , • „, Z- ~,.„u „u„ 
, -
 J v
. . . . on retirement n (l) all the terms and conditions ot such plan 
mav be necessarv to carrv out the provisions oi this para- . , , „ , , _ • , •
 tt .r„„„Q 
- -
 v v
 in existence on such date had remained in existence until 
g r a P ' such retirement, and (ii) his compensation taken into 
"(2) Transition rule for defined benefit plans.—In the case account for any period after October 2. 1973. had not 
of an individual who was an active participant in a defined exceeded his annual rate of compensation on such date, and 
benefit pian before October 3, 1973, if— 
"(A) the annual benefit (within the meaning of section "(C) in the case of a participant who separated from the 
415(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954) payable to service of the employer prior to October 2, 1973. such 
such participant on retirement does not exceed 100 percent annual benefit is no greater than his vested accrued benefit 
of his annual rate of compensation on the earlier of u) as of the date he separated from the service. 
[The next page is 4383-23.] 
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December 21, 1988 
Mr. Kelly G. Cardon 
427 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Munns vs Munns 
Dear Kelly: 
I am writing in response to your letter of December 12, 
1988, wherein you requested that Shelley Munns consent to the 
proposed sale of the Bear River City property which was awarded 
to your client. 
The Bear River City property is presently titled in the name 
of Shelley Munns. I have an executed quit-claim deed in my file 
transferring title to your client pursuant to the divorce decree. 
Mr. Pere Vlahos was provided quit-claim deeds on the farm 
properry which the decree awarded to Shelley. We would very much 
like to see the deeds exchanged so that both parties can do 
whatever they find necessary to preserve these assets or utilize 
them as needed. The farm is in danger of foreclosure because of 
arrearages on the trust deed. Shelley cannot refinance so long 
as the appeal is pending. 
If you can persuade Mary to drop at least that portion of 
the appeal disputing the property division and allocarion of 
debts, we would be more than happy to provide you with quit-claim 
deeds to all of the real estate which was awarded to Mary. In_ 
exchange, of course, we would require quit-claim deeds on the 
real estate which was awarded to Shelley. If Mary refuses this 
proposal, her present: sale may be lost, the farm may be lost, and 
everyone, including Mary, will suffer. Would you please try to 
reason with her on this. 
Very truly yours, 
MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE 
By. 
RE EC // HAOFIELD 
J £ F F P - H O R N E : 
SEN H ' - I A O F I E - . D 
BHH/pj 
cc: Shelley Munns 
